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Operation HighJump was the UNITED STATES NAVY ANTARCTIC DEVELOPMENTS PROJECT of 1946-1947
On October 15, 1946, Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, appointed Captain Richard H. Cruzen, who participated with Richard Byrd in the UNITED STATES ANTARCTIC SERVICE EXPEDITION 1939-41, as commander of Operation Highjump. Admiral Mitscher instructed Cruzen to terminate the project when the ice and sea conditions rendered further research "unprofitable". It was "not intended that any ship or aircraft remain in the Antarctic during the winter months". Cruzens own orders were initiated two days later, centered around the construction and establishment of "a temporary base on Ross Shelf Ice in Antarctica" in order to "extend [the] explored area" of the continent and to "test material under frigid conditions". On November 20, only two weeks before the first ships were to sail, Cruzen released supplementary instructions which specified ship departure dates and movements, personnel and equipment assignments, and so forth. Additionally, another ship was added to the list of those heading south --- the new fleet aircraft carrier USS PHILIPPINE SEA --- with Admiral Richard Byrd aboard. She would have six R4D military transport planes lashed to the deck for land-based use at Little America IV. Admiral Byrd would fly an R4D into Little America IV and assume the role of chief scientific commander of the project. Before ceasing operations, Byrd was to make a flight over the South Pole. Although these were the stated plans and objectives of the project, the purpose and origin of the ANTARCTIC DEVELOPMENTS PROJECT 1946-47 was much more complex.
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The first to lay a legitimate claim could possibly extract an abundance of expensive, necessary raw materials of The formal American position on the polar regions had always been that they should be open to exploration and research by all concerned but in the wake of Admiral Byrd's formal announcement of OPERATION HIGHJUMP on November 12, 1946, Latin American governments became nervous and suspicious of the notorious American Yankee.
OPERATION HIGHJUMP was seen as a huge threat to future Latin American claims. After all, thirteen ships with 4,700 men seemed to confirm the notion that the United States had a plan of their own to seize huge chunks of the continent. The official press release by Byrd seemed to confirm their anxiety as OPERATION HIGHJUMP was justified as an "extension" of the United States Navy's "policy of developing the ability of naval forces to operate under any and all climatic conditions". A publicly stated objective was to "consolidate and develop the results of the US ANTARCTIC SERVICE EXPEDITION 1939-41". As it turns out, the Latin suspicions were correct. Initial approval of OPERATION HIGHJUMP was apparently reached at a meeting of the "Committee of Three" (Secretary of State, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy) on August 7, 1946. A memorandum prepared for the meeting stated that the "Navy proposes to send an expedition to the Antarctic early in 1947. The purpose of this expedition includes training personnel and testing material, consolidating and extending U.S. sovereignty over Antarctic areas, investigating possible base sites and extending scientific knowledge in general. Rear Admiral R.E. Byrd will be designated as Officer-in-Charge of the project. Task Force Commander will be Captain R. H. Cruzen now commanding OPERATION NANOOK , an expedition to the Arctic". One week after the meeting, Edward G. Trueblood, deputy director of the State Department's Latin American desk, sent a memorandum to the head of the European desk stating there was no objection to the "Byrd Expedition" so long as no territories claimed by certain Latin American governments were entered. On August 22, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave his department's approval to OPERATION HIGHJUMP with the stipulation that "in view of the territorial claims in the Antarctic of other Governments, it is suggested that the areas to be visited by the proposed naval expedition be discussed informally between representatives of the State and Navy Departments. . ." That discussion was held on November 25, only one week prior to the first ships departing. Acheson wrote the Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal on December 14 and told him of his "complete agreement" with the majority opinion reached at the November meeting and "that this Government should follow a definite policy of exploration and use of those Antarctic areas considered desirable for acquisition by the United States". Since the formal opinion of the United States had been not to recognize any territorial claims in the Antarctic, "in the view of this Department vessels, aircraft or personnel of the US NAVAL ANTARCTIC DEVELOPMENTS PROJECT 1947 are not precluded by prior territorial rights or claims of other states from entering and engaging in lawful activity in any of those areas or from making symbolic claims thereto or to newly discovered territory on behalf of the United States". Admiral Marc Mitscher, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, was even more daring in his "Instructions for OPERATION HIGHJUMP " issued on October 15. "Objectives" included "Consolidating and extending United States sovereignty over the largest practicable area of the Antarctic continent". Perhaps the Departments of State and Navy had wished for major territorial claims, but the fact of the matter is that no formal claims were made by the men of OPERATION HIGHJUMP. It was notlaunched in a scramble for Antarctica's natural resources nor was it launched for the chief purpose of territorial expansion. According to news releases of Admiral Byrd's November 12 press conference announcing OPERATION HIGHJUMP, "The Navy strongly discounted reports that the voyage will be primarily a lap in the race for uranium. 'When this expedition was first talked about, uranium wasn't even mentioned. The statement that this is a uranium race for atomic energy is not correct', Admiral Byrd was quoted as saying. However, the basic objectives were not diplomatic, scientific or economic -- they were military. OPERATION HIGHJUMP was, and to this day still is, the largest Antarctic expedition ever organized. Immediately below you will find a short video about it for your convenience:
Admiral Byrd's comments in his press release of November 12, 1946, stated that " . . . the purposes of the operation are primarily of a military nature, that is to train naval personnel and to test ships, planes and equipment under frigid zone conditions. . . A major purpose of the expedition is to learn how the Navy's standard, everyday equipment will perform under everyday conditions". The Soviets were paying close attention to this project and editorialized in their naval journal, Red Fleet, following Byrd's press conference that "U.S. measures in Antarctica testify that American military circles are seeking to subject the [polar] regions to their control and to create there permanent bases for their armed forces".
Soviet-American relations were rapidly deteriorating throughout 1946 and with American interest in both polar regions steaming up, Russian anxiety was escalating with each passing day. The Soviets were quick to realize that if a Third World War broke out between Russia and the West, a strategic battleground would most likely be in the North Polar region. It was in Americas best interest to expose and prepare their men, ships and equipment to the extremes of the polar regions as quickly and efficiently as possible.
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The American political environment of 1946 also played a valuable role in OPERATION HIGHJUMP . Following the end of World War II, many political debates around the country focused on the merits of a single unified military command under a single department of national defense. At first, navy brass embraced the notion. However, as more details came forth, fears arose of a navy dominated by the arrogant and chafing young generals of the air force who would subordinate the Navy to simple coastal defense procedures. Talk was floating around Washington that the marine corps would operate under the army while aircraft carriers would be under the direction of the air force. Obviously, the consolidation would save the American taxpayers a great deal of money but the navy would simply have no part of it. Consequently, the navy lost a great deal of public support. By the middle of 1946, admirals were searching for a way to dramatize the navy's efficiency. This anxiety, coupled with the escalating cold war, created the opportunity to heavily expand on polar exploration.
The first naval program of polar exploration was OPERATION FROSTBITE in the fall and winter of 1945-46. A handful of ships accompanied the new aircraft carrier USS MIDWAY to the Davis Straits, off the coast of Greenland, where men and equipment "underwent a grueling test. Torn by high seas and raging blizzards in extreme cold and with drifts of snow across the flight deck, they operated under the most exacting conditions to prove that such operations are feasible". However, OPERATION FROSTBITE had not been conducted far enough to the north. Arctic summers are simply too mild to adequately expose and train men for subzero temperatures.
Thus, in order to train a large enough navy for polar conditions, testing would be required in regions of severest weather for a prolonged period of time.
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On February 12, 1946, Congress approved Public Law 296 directing the chief of the U.S. Weather Bureau to establish "an international meteorological reporting network in the Arctic regions of the Western Hemisphere". The Weather Bureau turned to the army and navy and together, the three agencies came up with a plan to build reporting stations that summer at Thule, Greenland and at the southern tip of Melville Island in the Canadian Arctic. The U.S. Atlantic Fleet commander, Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, selected a few ships, designated them Task Force 68, and appointed Captain Richard Cruzen as commander of OPERATION NANOOK. Admiral Curzen's first orders, issued May 31, 1946, called for a general plan whose second phase consisted "of operations to establish weather observation and reporting stations of the U.S. Weather Bureau" in the Canadian Arctic and Greenland. Additionally, Cruzen ordered one icebreaker, the EASTWIND, along with a seaplane tender, the NORTON SOUND, to operate "in the general vicinity of the southern limit of the ice pack which is expected to be encountered in the Baffin Bay area". This may have been a peaceful project to make weather observations in the Arctic, but an interesting argument could be made that these stations would be additionally used as intelligence gathering sites. Regardless, with these two projects the U.S. Navy began its effort to systematically expose men and machine to the rigors of polar life.