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Chief Justice John Marshall, who had received 10,000 acres in grants west of the Appalachians in return for fighting in the Revolutionary War, declared, invoking an obscure Norman law, that the land was "vacant" and therefore Euro-American deeds were legitimate. By 1832, he was declaring that all natives were "subordinate" to the U.S., a simple statement of colonialism, before the genocide of Western tribes had even begun. Marshall went even further and declared that natives "committed aggression" when they attempted to regain control of their land.

In 1823, the Christian Doctrine of Discovery was quietly adopted into U.S. law by the Supreme Court in the celebrated case, Johnson v. McIntosh (8 Wheat. 543). Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice John Marshall observed that Christian European nations had assumed "ultimate dominion" over the lands of America during the Age of Discovery, and that - upon "discovery" - the Indians had lost "their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations," and only retained a right of "occupancy" in their lands. In other words, Indians nations were subject to the ultimate authority of the first nation of Christendom to claim possession of a given region of Indian lands. [Johnson:574; Wheaton:270-1]

According to Marshall, the United States - upon winning its independence in 1776 - became a successor nation to the right of "discovery" and acquired the power of "dominion" from Great Britain. [Johnson:587-9] Of course, when Marshall first defined the principle of "discovery," he used language phrased in such a way that it drew attention away from its religious bias, stating that "discovery gave title to the government, by whose subject, or by whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other European governments." [Johnson:573-4] However, when discussing legal precedent to support the court's findings, Marshall specifically cited the English charter issued to the explorer John Cabot, in order to document England's "complete recognition" of the Doctrine of Discovery. [Johnson:576] Then, paraphrasing the language of the charter, Marshall noted that Cabot was authorized to take possession of lands, "notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives, who were heathens, and, at the same time, admitting the prior title of any Christian people who may have made a previous discovery." [Johnson:577]

In other words, the Court affirmed that United States law was based on a fundamental rule of the "Law of Nations" - that it was permissible to virtually ignore the most basic rights of indigenous "heathens," and to claim that the "unoccupied lands" of America rightfully belonged to discovering Christian European nations. Of course, it's important to understand that, as Benjamin Munn Ziegler pointed out in The International Law of John Marshall, the term "unoccupied lands" referred to "the lands in America which, when discovered, were 'occupied by Indians' but 'unoccupied' by Christians." [Ziegler:46]

Ironically, the same year that the Johnson v. McIntosh decision was handed down, founding father James Madison wrote: "Religion is not in the purview of human government. Religion is essentially distinct from civil government, and exempt from its cognizance; a connection between them is injurious to both."

This type of legal history is the foundation for Churchill's devastating critique of U.S. government policies toward indigenous peoples in the United States. Struggle for the Land is a series of precise, factual case studies of, for example, the Iroquois efforts to reclaim their land in upstate New York (the entire city of Syracuse is on native land), and the Lakota refusal to accept any amount of money for the Black Hills. One of the most important facts in the book, though, is that Hitler used the United States treatment of Indians as a model for his genocide. Consequently in 1946, as the United States was preparing to sit in judgment on the Nazis at Nuremberg, the Indian Claims Commission Act was passed in order to provide a new veneer of legal rights to Indians, ostensibly giving them the right to sue for lost land if claims were based on "fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mistake," which, of course, they were.

In another section, Churchill describes the "radioactive colonization" of native land (i.e., the pursuit of mining rights for uranium (60 percent lies on native reservations), and oil and gas (20 percent on native reservations). Ninety percent of mining takes place on native land. In one concise chart, Churchill outlines 33 different corporations who have leases in areas in Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. There are more than 5,000 in the Black Hills alone. Locally, the Hanford plutonium plant leaks toxins from storage tanks into the fishing grounds of the Columbia River Yakima, leading to illness, sickened, malformed and dead fish, and a host of other problems.

The funds from leases are kept in "trust" by the government, and, of course, the tribes see little of them. This Northern Plains Lady, Elouise Cobell, is bringing the issue to the light of day in court. This is an excerpt from an article in 2004 Blackfeet Reservation Development Fund, Inc.

FEDERALLY IMPOSED ‘BIA TRIBES’

Adding to the confusion is what constitutes a "tribe" legally. Most "tribes" today are a lumping together of bands, in some cases, even separate groups that had warred against each other. Tribal governments reflect federal requirements, not traditional practices either in selection of leaders or administration.

 

In effect, they are BIA-Tribes, that is, groups of individuals who hold a federal franchise on a legally recognized status designated as a Tribe for legal purposes, defined by treaty, and overseen and held to rules of accountability outlined by the BIA.

In 1978, the BIA enacted administrative procedures governing the administrative process for federal acknowledgment (Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 83) of what it would consider to be a “tribe.”

 

From 1935 to 1974, the BIA determined tribal existence based on one or more criteria: a) had treaty relations with the U.S.; b) had been denominated a tribe by act of Congress or executive order; c) had been treated as having collective rights in tribal lands or funds; d) had been treated by a tribe or band by other tribes; or e) had exercised political authority over its members through a tribal council or other governmental forms.

 

The 1978 regulations set seven criteria:

1. The tribe has been identified by reliable external sources on a substantially continuous basis as an Indian entity since 1900.

2. The tribe has maintained a continuous community from historical times to the present day.

3. The tribe has maintained political authority or influence over its members on a substantially continuous basis from historical times until the present day; and

4. Has a governing document which it must submit, or if it does not have a formal governing document, a statement describing its government operations and membership criteria over its affairs and members; and

5. The current members of the tribe, as a whole, descend from a historic tribe or tribes that amalgamated; and

6. Tribal members are not principally members of an already recognized tribe; and

7. The tribe was not terminated by legislation. 

 

This has led to a proliferation of "tribes," but not to what constitutes an American Indian other than defined by BIA-Tribe rules or offering any protection for non-tribal Indians (people of Native descent who have no federal BIA-Tribe affiliation; for example, people who have left the reservation or family group and cut ties for a generation or more; or married outside the tribe and skipped a generation; or cannot document their genealogy).  For these individuals, even if practicing Native American Spirituality, and "Indian," by belief, custom, or origin, there is no specific legal protection. The guarantee of religious freedom is not specified and falls under general laws and First Amendment freedoms.  While that should be enough to guarantee freedom of expression, in practice it has proven problematic, which led to (among other discrepancies) a move over a decade ago to the writing of the Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1993.

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